Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
There is a rapidly growing crisis of constitutional legitimacy in a dangerously divided American Republic. Could the November 3, 2026, midterm elections become the beginning of a turning point of constitutional governance, accompanied by escalating political violence? Clearly, the United States of America is approaching the November 3rd midterm elections under circumstances that raise questions far more consequential than which political party will control Congress. The central question is whether the American constitutional system can continue to manage increasingly hateful political disagreements through peaceful, lawful, and mutually accepted procedures.
For nearly two and a half centuries, the American Republic has survived extraordinary challenges: foreign wars, economic depressions, presidential assassinations, ideological extremism, constitutional crises, and one devastating Civil War. Its endurance depended not upon the absence of political conflict, but upon the ability of constitutional institutions to contain those conflicts. Today, the possibility that political disagreement could deteriorate into sustained violence deserves serious consideration.
A Second American Civil War is neither inevitable nor established as a probable outcome. Nevertheless, the circumstances under which civil conflict becomes conceivable merit examination before events render preventive action impossible. Democracy presupposes disagreement. The Founding Fathers understood that competing interests, ambitions, and convictions were unavoidable characteristics of human societies. James Madison’s analysis of factions in Federalist No. 10 was founded upon precisely this recognition. The constitutional solution was not to eliminate disagreement, but to prevent any faction from acquiring unlimited power. Yet, the American political system faces an increasingly consequential distinction between political competition and political enmity. Competition recognizes opponents as legitimate participants in shared constitutional order. Enmity treats them as existential threats whose acquisition of power must be prevented by extraordinary means. When citizens conclude that electoral defeat represents not a temporary political setback, but the destruction of their country, the psychological foundations of democratic compromise begin to weaken. Under these conditions, every election can become a struggle over the legitimacy of the entire political system. The danger is not merely ideological polarization. It is the possible disappearance of a shared commitment to constitutional procedures.
The November elections will determine the composition of the House of Representatives, a substantial portion of the Senate, and numerous state governments. Their constitutional significance extends beyond the immediate distribution of political authority. If Congress remains under Republican control, disputes may intensify over the relationship between presidential authority and legislative oversight. If Democrats gain control of either chamber, the administration could face more aggressive investigations, legislative confrontation, budgetary disputes, and potential impeachment initiatives. None of these developments would inherently constitute a constitutional crisis. Indeed, congressional oversight, legislative resistance, and impeachment proceedings are established components of the American constitutional system. The danger would arise if political leaders or their supporters began treating the lawful exercise of these powers as inherently illegitimate. An equally serious problem would emerge if contested election results produced efforts to intimidate election officials, obstruct certification, or disregard binding judicial decisions. The critical period may, therefore, extend beyond Election Day. The counting and certification of ballots, the resolution of legal challenges, and the transition to the new Congress could become tests of institutional legitimacy. The decisive issue is whether the participants accept the constitutional rules even when those rules produce politically unwelcome outcomes. In this context, no public official should encourage political violence, excuse intimidation, or suggest that constitutional procedures become optional when political objectives are frustrated. Equally, peaceful protest must remain protected regardless of its political message. At the same time, freedom of expression does not confer the right to threaten, assault, or terrorize political opponents. A democratic government must preserve both constitutional liberty and public security. Sacrificing either in the name of protecting the other would undermine the very constitutional order supposedly being defended.
The most consequential post-election crisis might initially appear not as violence, but as governmental paralysis. Consider a scenario involving a divided Congress, repeated budgetary confrontations, competing claims of executive and legislative authority, and escalating disputes over compliance with judicial rulings. Each controversy might be legally manageable in isolation. Together, however, they could create an atmosphere in which the constitutional government appears incapable of resolving fundamental disputes. Such paralysis could strengthen extremist narratives claiming that democratic procedures have become useless. The danger would increase if organized groups attempted to replace lawful political participation with intimidation or coercion. This is why political violence must be understood not merely as a criminal justice problem, but also as a potential challenge to constitutional legitimacy. A government that cannot protect the peaceful exercise of political rights risks weakening public confidence. A government that responds to disorder through indiscriminate repression risks weakening the confidence even further. Constitutional restraint is, therefore, not a luxury during national emergencies. It is one of the essential conditions for preventing emergencies from becoming crises of the republic itself.
A serious American constitutional crisis would have implications far beyond the country’s borders. The United States of America remains central to NATO, international financial markets, global trade, and the security arrangements of numerous allied countries. Its ability to exercise international leadership depends partly upon the credibility and continuity of its domestic institutions. Prolonged governmental instability could complicate military planning, weaken diplomatic coordination, and create uncertainty among allies and adversaries. The Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and other governments would undoubtedly assess such developments in terms of their own strategic interests. The danger is not necessarily that foreign powers would cause an American constitutional crisis. It is that they could exploit an existing crisis through disinformation, diplomatic pressure, or opportunistic foreign policy initiatives. American constitutional stability is, therefore, not simply a domestic political concern. It is a significant element of international security.
Clearly, the Republic is more important than its political parties. The approaching midterm elections present an opportunity to test the resilience of the American constitutional government. Therefore, the question after November 3rd will be larger than who controls Congress. It will be whether Americans continue to recognize that the Constitution belongs equally to those who win elections and those who lose them.