Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
The People’s Republic of China does not need to conquer the European Union and the continent at large. It does not need European governments to become communists, pro-Chinese or even anti-American. Beijing only needs something much simpler: a Europe sufficiently economically dependent, politically more divided, and strategically splintered away that it cannot act in unison when Chinese and European interests collide.
For the last three decades, the declaratively sovereign Hungary offered Beijing an ideal instrument for achieving that objective. Hungary is the poorest and the most corrupt country of fewer than ten million inhabitants of the European Union. Its economy has been managed since 1918, mostly by incompetent politicians and managers. Therefore, it cannot be compared at all with Germany’s, France’s, or Italy’s. Yet, its geopolitical value to President Xi Jinping is extraordinary because Hungary sits simultaneously inside the European, NATO, the Schengen area, and the European single market. Beijing, therefore, discovered something remarkable in Budapest: a relatively inexpensive entrance into some of the most important institutions of the Western world.
In spite of this Chinese reality, the most essential point is almost completely overlooked. The People’s Republic of China does not have a vote in Brussels. Hungary does. And that fact explains much of Beijing’s extraordinary courtship of Budapest. Moreover, Beijing’s Hungarian policy has generally been discussed in terms of investment: CATL batteries, BYD automobiles, the Budapest-Belgrade railway, and numerous technology and infrastructure projects. These investments are unquestionably important by themselves. But concentrating exclusively upon their commercial value misses their geopolitical significance. A Chinese factory in Hungary accomplishes something a Chinese factory in Shenzhen cannot. Partially, it creates Hungarian jobs. Partially, it creates Hungarian suppliers. It creates Hungarian tax revenues. It creates Hungarian municipalities dependent upon continued production. It also creates Hungarian politicians who have something to lose if relations with Beijing deteriorate. And ultimately, it creates European economic interests opposed to policies that might injure Chinese companies. The Chinese factory in Hungary becomes more than a Chinese factory. It becomes a constituency. This is a twenty-first-century influence at its most sophisticated. Beijing does not necessarily have to purchase politicians beyond Hungary. It can create economic circumstances in which politicians independently conclude that protecting relations with the People’s Republic of China serves their own personal political interests too. This essential distinction is extremely important. Influence need not require ubiquitous corruption. Dependency can accomplish what unceasing bribery could do in much less elegant fashion.
This leads to the larger strategic misunderstanding concerning Beijing. It does not need European satellites. It needs Hungary and through the latter it needs European fragmentation. A Europe fighting over tariffs benefits the People’s Republic of China.. A Europe divided over the Republic of China – Taiwan – benefits the People’s Republic of China. A Europe divided over telecommunications security benefits the People’s Republic of China. A Europe competing internally for Chinese factories benefits the People’s Republic of China enormously. And a Europe, in which individual governments calculate that defending European strategic interests might cost them billions of euros in Chinese investment is precisely the kind of Europe Beijing would prefer to confront. Finally, the European Union’s enormous economic power depends upon its ability to act collectively. Fragment that collective power and Beijing can negotiate with European states individually. The imbalance then becomes overwhelming. Divide et impera did not originate in Beijing. But Beijing has learned the principle extremely well.
The change of government on April 12, 2026, in Budapest, Hungary, now creates a one-in-a-lifetime opportunity. The central question is no longer whether the unimaginably corrupt Viktor Orban was too accommodating toward the People’s Republic of China. It is whether the economic architecture his Gangsterocracy constructed has become sufficiently entrenched that Hungary’s China policy cannot easily change even after the government did. Admittedly, Hungary’s new government has already demonstrated greater willingness to impose environmental scrutiny upon the enormous battery industry corruptly created during the Orban Gangsterocracy. Yet, enforcing existing environmental regulations is only the beginning. Hungary now requires something considerably more ambitious: a comprehensive national-security audit of its economic relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Not an anti-Chinese purge. Not economic isolation. Not ideological hysteria. What is needed is strategic accounting. Which industries create unacceptable dependencies? Which investments genuinely transfer technology and knowledge to Hungary? Which merely transforms Hungary into an assembly platform? How dependent are Hungarian industries upon Chinese supply chains? What happens if relations between the People’s Republic of China and the European Union deteriorate sharply? What happens if a Taiwan crisis produces European sanctions? What happens to Hungarian manufacturing if Chinese-European trade becomes a geopolitical battlefield?
Friendship is not foreign policy. Hungary should maintain diplomatic and commercial relations with the People’s Republic of China. Beijing is too important economically and geopolitically to ignore. A policy of indiscriminate hostility toward Beijing would be foolish. Yet, the Voktor Orban’s idiotic notion of friendship-based foreign policy is a dangerous concept when it replaces calculation. Beijing conducts foreign policy according to Chinese interests. Hungary must conduct foreign policy according to Hungarian interests. Where those interests coincide, cooperation should exist. Where they diverge, Budapest must retain the freedom to say no. That should become the governing principle of Hungary’s future China policy.
Presently, Hungary’s tragedy is that Viktor Orban’s ruthless corruption was linked to his unprofessional belief that Beijing could replace Brussels’ influence. Xi Jinping had a different calculation. He understood that Viktor Orban’s corrupt Gangsterocracy could help Beijing acquire great influence in Brussels. That was the fundamental asymmetry of their relationship. Beijing was not merely investing in Hungary. It was investing in Hungary’s location, its EU membership, its political influence and its capacity to prevent European consensus. Thus, Hungary’s most valuable asset was always something Beijing could never manufacture in the People’s Republic of China – a seat at Europe’s table.
Therefore, Hungary’s task after Viktor Orban is not to close the door to Beijing. It is to make certain that Hungary – not Beijing – decides how far that door remains open.