By Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
According to the prominent Athenian politician and general Themistocles, “He who commands the sea has command of everything.” However, history rarely repeats itself exactly. Yet, it does exhibit recurring strategic patterns. Across more than two millennia, rising powers have repeatedly attempted to transform nearby seas from open commercial highways into protected strategic domains. Athens sought mastery of the Aegean, Rome of the Mediterranean, Great Britain of the global oceans, Japan of the Western Pacific, and then the United States of America established maritime predominance across the Caribbean before projecting naval power worldwide.
The People’s Republic of China’s contemporary maritime strategy mirrors this long historical tradition. Yet, it also differs in important respects. Rather than acquiring colonies in the classical imperial way, Beijing seeks influence through a combination of historical claims, economic statescraft, technological capabilities, legal arguments, and calibrated coercion. It is a peculiar strategy “with Chinese characteristics” shaped as much by globalization as by geopolitics. Therefore, the central question is not whether the People’s Republic of China is becoming a major maritime power – it unquestionably has – but what kind of maritime order it seeks to create.
For much of its long history, China was fundamentally a continental power. Dynasties devoted their greatest attention to internal cohesion, river systems, agriculture, and threats from the Eurasian steppe. The Great Wall symbolizes China’s strategic orientation far more than any navy. This inward focus was interrupted during the early Ming dynasty. Between 1405 and 1433, the Muslim admiral Zheng He commanded seven extraordinary expeditions across the Indian Ocean, reaching Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and East Africa. These voyages demonstrated impressive maritime capabilities, but were designed primarily to reinforce the imperial tributary system rather than to establish overseas colonies or permanent naval dominance.
After Zheng He’s final expedition, successive Ming rulers gradually abandoned ambitious naval projects. Resources were redirected toward defending the northern frontier and China withdrew from sustained blue-water operations. By the time European maritime empires emerged, China had largely relinquished the initiative at sea. This historical reversal remains deeply significant. Many Chinese scholars interpret the subsequent “Century of Humiliation” – from the two Opium Wars through foreign concessions and Japanese invasion – as a direct consequence of maritime weakness. In this narrative, contemporary naval modernization is not an act of expansion alone, but also one of historical restoration.
Historically speaking and as opposed to Athens’ and Rome’s maritime strategies, Beijing emphasizes freedom of navigation, while simultaneously asserting expansive jurisdiction over international waters. This contrast illustrates an important strategic direction. Rome sought universal access under Roman authority with the slogan of “Mare Nostrum” – “Our Sea.” Beijing seeks greater authority within waters it considers historically connected to its sovereignty. Whether those claims are accepted internationally remains a matter of significant dispute. Presently, unlike Great Britain, Beijing does not seek worldwide naval supremacy. Its primary concern remains the Western Pacific and the sea lanes linking East Asia to the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, Chinese investments in overseas ports, logistics facilities, and naval deployments increasingly extend its operational reach beyond regional waters. In this sense, Beijing’s maritime strategy reflects selective globalization rather than classical empire.
Historically though, Imperial Japan offers the most instructive comparison. During the late 19th century, Japan modernized rapidly and concluded that security required maritime predominance in East Asia. Victory over Imperial China in 1895 and Imperial Russia in 1905 reinforced this belief. Later, however, Japan’s pursuit of strategic self-sufficiency evolved into territorial conquest and military expansion. Although Beijing participates more deeply in the global economy and depends on international trade to an extent unmatched by Imperial Japan, yet both powers share a concern about maritime encirclement. Today, Xi Jinping’s dream of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” is explicitly Mahanian with his strategy of national greatness tied to be the best sea power, the greatest commercial shipping reservoir, with an overwhelming number of overseas bases, and the most powerful navy.
However, Beijing’s most distinctive maritime policy is its “Grey-Zone Strategy.” This includes coast guard patrols, militia vessels, administrative regulations, island construction, fishing fleets, economic pressure, and diplomatic messaging. Each of these actions appears limited individually. Collectively, however, they gradually strengthen Beijing’s position, while complicating military responses from affected states. This incremental approach is unique because outright war in an interconnected world would carry enormous costs. Moreover, Beijing argues that foreign military operations near its coastline threaten national security. This complex Chinese strategy runs afoul of Washington, D.C. ‘s view that freedom of navigation and alliance commitments are essential to regional stability. The resulting tensions are structural rather than merely political. They reflect the interaction between an established maritime power and an emerging one.
Clearly, Beijing’s maritime ambitions are about more than reefs or shipping lanes. Control of nearby seas affects energy security, technological leadership, fisheries, access to critical minerals, military deterrence, national prestige, and political legitimacy. Even more globally, Beijing’s maritime strategy forms the most essential part of Xi Jinping’s dream of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Unquestionably, the People’s Republic of China stands at a pivotal moment in this historical tradition. Its remarkable naval modernization reflects genuine strategic calculations rooted in history, geography, and dependence on maritime trade. At the same time, aspects of its conduct in disputed waters have generated significant concern among neighboring states and have been criticized as inconsistent with established principles of international maritime law. Whether the 21st century Pacific becomes a theater of cooperation or rivalry will depend less on the number of ships launched than on whether competing powers can reconcile legitimate security interests with respect for international norms. History offers no guarantee of success. It does, however, remind us that maritime competition has shaped the rise and decline of great powers over two thousand years. The challenge before the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, and the nations of the Indo-Pacific is to avoid repeating the cycles of escalation that so often transformed strategic rivalry into destructive conflicts.