By Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
The Houthi political and military organization – officially known as Ansar Allah (in English: Partisans of God) – is Islamic Zaydi Shi’ism that follows the teachings of Zayd ibn Ali (d. around 740 CE). Zaydism is centered on the belief that the rightful leader of the Muslim Ummah must be a descendant of Ali the the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed and Fatimah the only surviving child of the Prophet Mohammed, whose upright righteousness as well as knowledge are the guarantees of the purity of Islam against injustice. Unlike other Shi’a sects, Zaydis do not believe that the Imam must be divinely appointed or infallible. Compared particularly to the Twelver Shi’ism, the Zaydis reject the idea of 12 specific, divinely chosen Imams. Moreover, they do not believe in occultation – the return of the hidden Imam. Finally, their theology is less mystical and more rationalist. Compared to Sunniism, the Zaydis agree that leadership should be from qualified individuals, but insist that it must come from the Prophet Mohammed’s family. This last requirement is called in Arabic the Ahl al-Bayt. Finally, their legal system is closer to the main Sunni schools, especially to the Hanafi jurisprudence, which emphasizes justice, activism and resistance to tyranny than to the doctrine of Velayat -e Fakih. In simple terms, Zaydism is often described as a “middle path” between Sunni and Shi’a Islam.
This introduction is essential in understanding the importance of Zaydism in modern Yemeni politics. Historically, Northern Yemen was ruled until 1962 by Zaydi Imams who combined religious authority and political leadership. When the Zaydi Imams monarchy was overthrown by the republican elites, the former lost political dominance. This lost political dominance was resurrected in the 1990s in Northern Yemen by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi who transformed the religious movement into a military cum political force. Through several wars with the secular Yemeni government and having taken advantage of the ensuing instability of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, the Houthis seized the capital Sana’a in 2014. This internal conflict quickly became international when the sectarian narratives of Sunni versus Shi’a have turned into a proxy battleground between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Today, the Houthis are mostly considered to be a part of Tehran’s broader regional network – also called the Axis of Resistance alongside groups in Lebanon and Iraq – aimed at countering American, Israeli as well as Saudi influence. Yet, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Asa’ib Ahl Haq, the Badr Organization, the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, the Lata’ib Imam Ali Brigades, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Houthis are not simple proxies because they are not fully controlled by Tehran. The main reason is that the Houthis political and economic priorities are more domestic rather than regional. Thus, importantly for the United States of America, the State of Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and beyond, the relationship between the Houthis and Tehran is more a “hybrid relationship” than a full-fledged proxy dependence because of the former’s insistence on retaining their sovereign autonomy.
Even more essentially, while the Houthis appear to be unified externally, internally they are shaped by Yemen’s complex political as well as tribal landscape. After seizing Sana’a in 2014, the Houthis came into direct military conflicts with various opposing movements and tribes across the country. As far as Yemen’s tribal system is concerned, the Houthis rely heavily on support from major northern tribes. However, tribal loyalties are not uniform, and internal dissent does exist. This reality creates ongoing tensions between central Houthi leadership and local commanders. This conundrum of disunity is even made more problematic by the Houthis’ standoff with the internationally recognized government of Yemen, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) whose objective is independence for South Yemen, which is backed by the United Arab Emirates.
Also, the Houthis are not a monolithic organization. Within the organization there are competing elites. The leadership that concentrated in the hands of the al-Houthi extended family is not uncontested. Most of the differences exist over governance, resource distribution, and war strategy. Therefore, even alliances have been unstable. The most publicized violent confrontation happened with ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh who was eliminated hours after a “brotherly” dinner. The interaction between external ties and internal dynamics must be also taken into account. Focusing too much on Iran-supported regional agendas will surely lead to tensions with the local population whose concerns are mainly economic hardship and good governance.
For the rest of the world, the most important issue is the potential closing of the Bab-al-Mandab Strait between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Here again, there are at least three opinions within the Houthi organization. The first group would want to limit military adventurism against foreign ships. Another group believes in a more aggressive posture. The third group rejects any military action in the Strait and also is against joining Iran in its war against the United States of America and the State of Israel. This last group even demands the Iranian advisors’ speedy departure – together with the Hamas troublemakers as well as the Islamic Jihad terrorists – from Sana’a.
In conclusion, the Houthis represent a complex political and military problem coupled with both regional geopolitics and complex domestic realities. Their relationship with Tehran has evolved into a significant strategic partnership. However, this relationship has never been total dependency. After the recent war with the United States of America and the State of Israel, there is room to call the Houthis’ attention to prioritize their own interests. Thus, understanding the Houthis requires moving beyond the simplistic label of an “Iranian proxy” and recognizing them as a locally rooted organization navigating largely unsuccessfully both internal fragmentation and external alliances.