By Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
When the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vetoed the previously agreed upon 90 billion Euros financial support package for Ukraine on March 20, 2026, at the European Council Summit, the reaction across the European member states was swift and familiar: moral outrage and renewed calls to put an end to Hungary’s unprincipled obstructionism. The reason was the fact that even though Hungary was not required to pay into the proposed loan, Viktor Orban linked his veto to an oil delivery dispute with Ukraine on the Russia-damaged “Friendship (Druzhba) Pipeline.” In reality, his veto was unambiguously politically motivated by his callously defeatist pro-Russian and anti-European policy.
President of the European Council Antonio Costa erupted thus against Viktor Orban: “Nobody can blackmail the European Union.” The German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described Viktor Orban’s veto as “an unprecedented act of disloyalty.” French President Emanuel Macron opined that Viktor Orban “must not be allowed to take the European Union hostage.” President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen swore that the European Union will deliver the 90 billion Euros loan to Kyiv “one way or the other”: intimating that Brussels will bypass Hungary if necessary. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas intoned the same pledge by saying: “There are alternatives…[but it will need] political character.” More generally and across the summit, leaders collectively accused Viktor Orban of “betrayal of prior agreements,” “blackmail tactics,” “undermining European unity and credibility,” using the Ukrainian loan controversy for “domestic election gains,” “Gangsterocracy,” and even ”Terrorism.”
But focusing exclusively on Viktor Orban misses the larger problem. His repeated vetoes are not the disease that has plagued the European Union since its hurried enlargement in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union – it is a symptom of a deeper structural weakness within this multilateral organization.
At the heart of the crisis lies one of the Union’s most persistent design flaws: the requirement for unanimity on key foreign policy and financial decisions. Conceived as a safeguard for national sovereignty, unanimity has evolved into a mechanism of paralysis. Viktor Orban has simply learned to use the rules more effectively than others. His veto power has allowed Hungary – representing less than 3% of the European Union’s population – to stall decisions backed by the overwhelming majority. This is not an aberration; it is the system working exactly as was originally designed. The result is a Union that aspires to geopolitical relevance but struggles to act with geopolitical speed.
Viktor Orban’s policies have also exposed a widening ideological divide within the European Union. While many member states view support for Ukraine as an existential security issue tied to the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War, Hungary has consistently pursued a more transactional, and Russia-leaning approach. This divergence reflects a broader tension: is the European Union a values-based political, economic, financial, and cultural organization, or merely a discombobulated coalition of real or destructive national interests? Until this question is resolved, similar standoffs will continue to exist – not just over Ukraine, but over migration, energy, and fiscal integration.
Brussels has attempted to discipline and even punish Hungary through the rule-of-law mechanism, freezing funds over concerns about self-destructive backslidings. Yet, this strategy has produced a paradox. Rather than compelling compliance, financial pressure has given Hungary additional leverage. By tying his approval of EU-wide initiatives to release of the frozen funds, Viktor Orban effectively turned conditionality into a bargaining chip. In trying to enforce its values, Brussels has inadvertently strengthened the hand of those willing to challenge them.
Another uncomfortable reality lies in the European Union’s expansion strategy. Over the past two decades, the Union has grown faster than it has deepened its political integration. Countries with distinct historical trajectories, governance standards, political cultures, or the lack thereof, and geopolitical orientations were brought into a system that assumed convergence – but never really guaranteed it. Viktor Orban’s Hungary is not an outlier in this sense. It is a case study of what happens when political integration lags behind institutional enlargement.
Clearly, the status quo within the European Union is a recipe for stagnation and ultimately geopolitical peripherality. Based on past as well as present experiences, there are only three realistic paths forward. First, reforming decision-making by expanding qualified majority voting in foreign policy and financial matters. Second, establishing parallel mechanisms by allowing willing member states to bypass blockers. Third, adding provisions to the Charter in order to banish obstructive member states from the Union with alacrity. Of course each option carries risks. But the current status quo carries the greatest risk at all: mounting irrelevance.
There is no doubt that Viktor Orban is an evil and self-destructive tyrant. His only policy is aimed at maintaining absolute power within Hungary and enriching himself and his family with criminal abundance. Yet, casting him the sole villain of the European Union’s failures is only part of the story. Allowing this to happen, is to encourage Brussels to avoid confronting its own shortcomings indefinitely. A multilateral organization that cannot act decisively in moments of crises will certainly find that crucial decisions will be made elsewhere. Viktor Orban did not yet break the Union. However, he revealed it.