Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
Over the last 16 years of Viktor Orban’s Gangsterocracy, his government used a mixture of official diplomacy, grossly overpaid lobbyists, and conservative network-building, supported by equally generous payouts, to raise its profile in Washington, D.C. From the so-called Hungarian Foundation, through the registered lobbying of the Policy Impact Strategic Communications, to the Danube Institute and the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), his government poured billions of dollars into creating the false impression of unassailable allegiance to the United States of America.
The question that should guide American-Hungarian relations by the new Peter Magyar-led government is simple: What can Hungary do for the United States of America and not what the latter can do for the former? A country of Hungary’s size cannot expect Washington, D.C. to treat it as a major power. It can, however, become a dependable ally in a region where dependable allies matter.
For too long, Hungarian leaders have approached the White House as though good relations depended chiefly on access to an American president, favorable rhetoric, or exemptions from difficult choices. None of these is a durable foreign policy. Americans have reason to judge an ally by what it contributes: military readiness, regional stability, secure investment, and a willingness to defend common interests when doing so carries a cost.
Hungary’s first opportunity is in NATO. Its geostrategic position in Central Europe gives Hungary value for transport, logistics, training, and cooperation with neighboring forces. Yet, geography alone is not a contribution. Hungary must maintain forces that can operate with its allies, invest in capabilities the alliance needs, and meet its spending commitments. NATO’s Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned in June that Hungary was among the allies likely to fall below the previous benchmark of 2% of GDP in 2026, even as the alliance had adopted a more demanding long-term investment commitment. Budapest should answer with a credible, funded defense plan.
The second opportunity is to help secure Europe against Russian coercion. That requires candor about Hungary’s own vulnerabilities. According to the European Commission’s 2026 country report, more than 90% of Hungary’s imported oil and 74% of its imported gas came from Russia in 2025. Dependence on a single supplier gives that supplier influence, regardless of what Budapest says about sovereignty. Hungary can reduce that exposure through alternative contracts, better connections with neighboring energy systems, and investment in its domestic infrastructure. Each practical step would strengthen Hungary, while making an American ally less susceptible to Moscow’s pressure.
Ukraine presents a more difficult test. Hungary should not overdo pressing Kyiv on the language and cultural rights of the very tiny ethnic Hungarians. It should pursue enforceable protections through sustained diplomacy. Those concerns do not require Hungary to obstruct every wider European decision concerning Ukraine. Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s government has signaled a more constructive approach, while continuing to oppose accelerated Ukrainian accession to the European Union. The White House should judge the Peter Magyar government by the decisions it makes: whether it helps maintain regional security and resolves bilateral disputes, or allows those disputes to become standing barriers to cooperation.
Hungary can also serve American interests through the European Union. Its vote in Brussels gives it influence beyond the size of its economy. Budapest should use that influence to support fair competition, resist coercive economic practices, and help Europe develop secure energy and technology supply chains. A Hungarian government need not agree with Washington, D.C. on every trade dispute. Its value lies in being a serious, predictable partner whose positions follow identifiable national interests and whose commitments can be trusted.
Trade requires equal realism. The United States of America exported about $3.4 billion in goods to Hungary in 2025 and imported about $11.8 billion. This is a meaningful bilateral relationship, especially for the firms and workers involved, but Hungary’s market is too small for being capable of transforming the American economy. Budapest’s better offer is a sound place for American companies to invest: transparent procurement, reliable courts, predictable regulations, and protection from favoritism. Those conditions would also benefit Hungarian businesses and taxpayers.
There is a further contribution that requires no grand strategy. Hungary can show that a Central European liberal and not “illiberal” democracy is capable of correcting abuses of power that existed under the Viktor Orban Gangsterocracy through lawful institutions, independent prosecutors, competitive public contracts, courts free to decide cases on the law, and accountability grounded in evidence would make Hungary a stronger ally. Washington, D.C. benefits when its partners can make and keep commitments without those commitments depending on one leader, or one election.
Hungary should pursue these policies for its own sake. That is precisely why they would give the relationship substance. A stronger Hungarian military protects Hungarians. Energy diversification protects Hungarian households and industry. An honest government protects Hungarian citizens. Cooperation with neighbors makes Hungary safer. The United States of America gains an ally whose interests increasingly support its promises.
Personal warmth between leaders may open a door, but it cannot carry a bilateral relationship. If Budapest wants greater standing in Washington, D.C., it should arrive with a record of useful decisions and a clear account of what it is prepared to do next. The White House will then have a compelling reason to listen.