By Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
Public as well as private discussions about the present state of affairs between the Islamic Republic of Iran on the one side and the United States of America and the State of Israel on the other, tend to oscillate between two poles: diplomacy or military confrontation. Sanctions versus strikes. Containment versus escalation. What is striking, however, is how rarely, if at all, these discussions center on the ideological architecture that is the foundation of the Iranian Mullahcracy: its ideological system, carefully cultivated and deeply embedded in all state as well as non-state institutions, education, and daily life.
This absence is not trivial. On the contrary, the ideological religious underpinning of this Mullahcracy is the cornerstone of its existence as well as its ultimate survival. For this reason, a deeper understanding of what gives this Mullahcracy its resilience is of utmost importance. Most essentially, the Islamic Republic is not merely a political phenomenon. It is a hybrid ideological-religious state that blends theology, nationalism, and coercive institutional control into a semi- coherent framework. Any judgment that declares this monster as simply another authoritarian regime risks missing the gist of its staying power.
At the heart of this system lies the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih – the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist – most prominently embodied in the person of the “Supreme Leader,” such as the late Ayatollahs Ruhollah Mostafavi Musavi Khomeini and Sayed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. This is not just a constitutional arrangement. It is the worldview that claims absolutely divine legitimacy. Accordingly, political authority is framed not as a temporary or negotiable worldly arrangement, but as an unquestionable religious obligation. This distinction does matter because it means that any opposition to the sovereignty of the “Supreme Leader,” appointed by God himself, is not merely dissent – it is heresy, betrayal of God, and supreme moral corruption on earth.
This ideological-religious framing is reinforced through multiple channels. The education system embeds mythical narratives from archaic ages. The Mullahcracy’s tightly controlled media construct a worldview, in which the Islamic Republic is perpetually under siege by evil external enemies, such as “The Great Satan” and “The Little Satan.” Religious institutions provide moral reinforcement, while organizations like the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij function not just as military and police bodies, but as ideological enforcers. Since 1979, all this has created what must be called an “Ecosystem of Faith,” where political tyranny is continuously legitimized by unassailable religious narratives.
Western discourse overwhelmingly overlooks this “Ecosystem of Faith” because it is extremely difficult to engage with. Military strategy can target infrastructure. Sanctions can aim at economic flows. But ideology as well as religion operates in a different domain – one that is diffuse, adaptive, and mostly resistant to external pressure. In fact, external pressure can often strengthen both. When the state frames sanctions or threats as proof of uncompromising foreign hostility, it reinforces its own narrative of resistance and victimhood.
This is where the current comprehension of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s situation becomes an intellectual cul-de-sac for the Western mind. Ideas about intervention – whether military or economic – tend to assume that weakening the state materially will lead to internal change. Yet, Persian and Iranian history suggests that ideological regimes can endure significant hardship, provided that they can successfully maintain narrative coherence. The people may suffer, but the system survives by reframing the suffering as sacrifice. In this respect, the contrast of the Western psychology with the Muslim mind is significant. In the Western cultures, inner factors are more important than external ones. This is the reason why the West is more individualistic than the East. Moreover, Muslim cultures are based on what I call the “Inshallah Mentality.” In this context, God — referred to as Allah by Islam — is the sole sovereign in the world. Therefore, he is the absolute ruler whose commands must be followed without questioning. Finally, the Qur’an declares in hundreds of verses that Muslim must not have empathy for non-Muslims who are their enemies. Thus, in extreme cases, the intersection between faith and terror is based on the misconstrued belief that Islamic terrorism is triggered by the infidels. Finally, this is also the reason why Muslims in the West struggle to be integrated – even if they sincerely desire to be part of those free societies.
Yet, none of this means that the Iranian people are uniformly aligned with the present tyrannical Mullahcracy. Far from it. Regular protests, cultural resistance, and generational shifts show deep tensions beneath the tyrannical surface. Many Iranians navigate a complex duality: outward conformity alongside private scepticism or even opposition. Yet these dynamics rarely lead to real systemic change, largely because the ideological and religious framework limits how dissent can organize and express itself.
So what would it actually mean to fight this ideological and religious system? First and foremost, it requires recognizing that ideology and religion cannot be dismantled solely through force. External actors have limited ability to directly reshape internal belief systems that are key to a nation’s as well as the person’s true identity. Attempts to do so can backfire, appearing as cultural imperialism. However, there are indirect paths: supporting the free flow of information, amplifying independent voices, and fostering cultural as well as intellectual exchanges. These paths do not attack the ideology and religion head-on; they create space for alternative narratives to emerge.
Second, it involves a shift in analytical perspective. Instead of viewing Iran primarily through the lens of geopolitics, policymakers and commentators would need to engage more deeply with its internal dynamics – its intellectual debates, its social fractures, its evolving generational attitudes. This will require patience and nuance, qualities often in short supply in fast-moving and biased political discourse.
Third, it demands humility about external influence. Any ideological and religious change is far more likely to emerge from within Iranian society than to be imposed from the outside. External pressure can shape conditions, but it cannot substitute for internal transformation.
In light of all the above, the lack of focus on ideology and religion is both understandable and problematic. It is understandable because both are complex, intangible, and difficult to address. It is problematic because ignoring it leads to incomplete and unrealistic expectations.
Unavoidably, the problem is not whether the tyrants of the Islamic Republic of Iran will face pressure or intervention, but whether the rest of the world is willing to seriously engage with the deeper forces that sustain this tyranny. Without that engagement, debates and actions will continue to circle around tactics, while the underlying structure remains largely untouched. And exactly for these reasons the Mullahcracy still endures.