Dr, Miklos K. Radvanyi
This biblical passage in the title from Ecclesiastes 4:12 concerns the strength of companionship and mutual protection. Applied to the alliance between the United States of America and the State of Israel, it suggests a partnership that makes both countries stronger.
The State of Israel’s emerging new security doctrine rests on a compelling proposition: a state cannot entrust its survival to a presumed restraint of enemies preparing to destroy it. October 7th exposed the catastrophic consequences of confusing temporary quiet with lasting deterrence. The correction – stronger defenses, readiness for surprise, and earlier action against intolerable threats – is necessary. Yet, the doctrine also rests on a less comfortable reality: the State of Israel’s freedom of action depends substantially on the United States of America. Any strategy that celebrates Israeli initiative while treating American support as inexhaustible is built on an assumption almost as dangerous as the complacency it seeks to replace.
There is still no single publicly available, approved document encompassing every aspect of the new approach. Government practice, military reform, and competing intellectual proposals must, therefore, be distinguished. Nevertheless, one important proposal, Eviatar Matania’s A New Security Doctrine for Israel, explicitly makes strategic reliance on the United States of America a core principle. That is a recognition of scale. The State of Israel possesses extraordinary capabilities, but it operates in a region containing much larger states, and within an international system where military success does not settle political disputes.
The United States of America supplies part of the strategic depth that geography denies the State of Israel. Advanced aircraft, weapons, spare parts, joint research, and replenishment arrangements support capabilities that the State of Israel would find difficult or prohibitively expensive to reproduce entirely at home. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has documented extensive American wartime resupply following October 7th. The essential distinction is between conducting an initial operation and sustaining its consequences. A government may authorize a strike independently; it cannot assume that ammunition, maintenance capacity, and replacement will remain available indefinitely afterward.
This distinction becomes even more consequential as the State of Israel moves toward repeated intervention against enemy rearmament. A short campaign and a prolonged struggle across several fronts impose different industrial demands. Tactical brilliance cannot manufacture interceptors overnight or eliminate maintenance requirements. Nor can the wealth of a technologically advanced economy remove every production bottleneck. The State of Israel’s doctrine with existing stocks, what domestic industry can replace, and what requires foreign cooperation. Otherwise, operational ambition can outrun the material foundations on which it depends.
The American role in defense is equally consequential. Joint development and production support the State of Israel’s layered missile defenses, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. These systems help protect civilians and preserve the infrastructure needed to fight. Their strategic significance extends beyond interception: credible protection against retaliation can make offensive more sustainable. Yet, defenses are finite. American assistance also draws on resources needed for American forces and other partners. The State of Israel must prepare for periods when the White House supports its security, while being unable or unwilling to provide every requested resource immediately.
American diplomatic backing guarantees another form of depth. It can reduce isolation, influence the terms of international debate, and facilitate cooperation with governments that would hesitate to engage the State of Israel directly. Such backing’s value is not just political, but also practical. A doctrine must emphasize preventive action, the necessity of intervention, the protection of civilians, and the intended outcome. Diplomatic credibility is an asset to preserve through conduct as well as argument. Most importantly, the United States of America can help convert military achievements into arrangements that endure. The State of Israel can destroy weapons and disrupt command structures. It cannot, through firepower alone, ensure competent administration, prevent renewed recruitment, finance reconstruction, or assemble regional enforcement commitments. American relationships with Arab governments offer opportunities to distribute those responsibilities. This requires realistic partners and enforceable obligations. It also requires the State of Israel to define the political conditions it seeks. If every victory leaves the same governance vacuum, the next campaign becomes increasingly predictable.
Here lies the doctrine’s central tension. The State of Israel and the United States of America share important interests, but their priorities are never identical. The State of Israel must protect communities close to hostile forces. The United States of America must also consider American personnel, Gulf partners, international shipping, energy markets, and commitments in Europe and Asia. These differences can produce disagreement over timing, escalation, negotiations, and the termination of hostilities. Neither country benefits from pretending otherwise. An alliance becomes more reliable when its participants identify disagreements before a crisis forces them into public confrontation.
The State of Israel should, therefore, reject both complacent dependence and theatrical declarations of complete independence. Greater domestic production, adequate reserves, diversified suppliers, and resilient infrastructure can reduce vulnerability to interruption. Matania’s proposal recognizes that stronger independent capabilities can make the American relationship healthier. The Israel Defense Ministry’s June 2026 announcement of negotiations over a successor to the assistance framework expiring in 2028, similarly emphasized joint research, development, production, and a gradual transition toward reciprocal partnership. These objectives point toward a relationship supported by practical contributions from both countries.
For the United States of America, reciprocity means assessing what Israeli intelligence, technology, operational experience, and regional capabilities contribute to American interest. For the State of Israel, it means understanding that friendship is maintained through institutions and public confidence. The U.S. Congress matters. Defense cooperation matters. Support extending across political parties matters. A close relationship between particular leaders cannot insure the partnership against elections, changing priorities, or public disillusionment. Israeli policy should strengthen the enduring American constituency for cooperation, while acknowledging that legitimate disagreements will remain. That also requires candid planning for American restraint. Israeli decision makers should know which objectives remain achievable if American participation is limited, supplies arrive slowly, or the White House favors a ceasefire. Such preparation projects sovereignty and gives consultation a firmer practical foundation.
The ultimate purpose of security policy is to preserve a society capable of living, producing, innovating, and governing freely. The State of Israel’s new security doctrine will succeed if it prevents catastrophic attacks, while protecting those foundations. It will falter if recurring military operations become their own justification, requiring ever greater American resources without producing a more sustainable regional order. The State of Israel needs sufficient strength to act when necessary and sufficient judgment to recognize what action can achieve. The United States of America is indispensable to the balance. The partnership’s highest achievement would be lasting security that reduces the frequency with which both nations must return to war.