Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
In today’s idiotic theatre of international diplomacy, the overwhelming majority of “great” political leaders have discovered a “revolutionary” principle: Democracy is no longer a prerequisite for statehood; promising democracy is absolutely sufficient. The most blatant case of this international tragicomedy is the leader for life of an Arab minority that calls itself arbitrarily “Palestinians,” whose presidential mandate expired in January 2009, and who since then annually assured everybody that democratic elections will be held for a new leader. Thus on the strength of his latest assurance, three years ago the French President Emanuel Macron recognized the nonexistent “State of Palestine.” President Macron, who will not be acknowledged as the sharpest knife in any French household, delivered recognition for a promise of democracy. Abbas keeps his presidency without elections. His Arab subjects keep waiting. Meanwhile, President Macron deservedly became an international laughingstock. One is reminded of the famous observation attributed to Talleyrand that diplomacy is the art of saying something without necessarily meaning it. Abbas has perfected the first half; Macron seems determined to believe the second.
Half-a-century earlier, on December 8, 1978, President Ronald Reagan popularized a traditional Russian proverb during Cold War nuclear disarmament negotiations with then Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev: “Trust, but verify.” Leaping almost fifty years ahead, President Trump’s recent discombobulated Russia policy could be summarized as “Trust President Putin, but verify President Zelenskyy.” More colloquially, “Trust Putin, but pressure Ukraine”; “Trust Putin, but verify his excuses”; “Trust Putin, but sanction him in the future”; “Trust Putin, but distrust your allies”; “Trust Putin, but verify nothing until it is too late.” These satires have a factual basis. President Trump very recently has waived key Russia-related sanctions, while his administration has described the so-called “Diesel Agreement” as a way to encourage the Kremlin to resume peace negotiations. In comparison, President Ronald Reagan told the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev : “Trust, but verify.” President Trump’s message to President Putin: “Trust, accommodate, and hope for the best.”
The dangerous constitutional and strategic consequences of President Trump’s Russian sanctions waiver are unambiguous. The American constitutional system was designed to prevent the concentration of governmental power in the hands of one individual. Yet, increasingly, the U.S. Congress behaves as though its principal responsibility is to proclaim national policies, while surrendering their implementation to the President. The latest and particularly disturbing illustration is President Trump’s decision to suspend the principal provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Clearly, such a congressional mentality and presidential power garb jointly run counter to James Madison’s foreign policy philosophy in the Federalist Papers, especially Federalist 10, 41-45, and 47-51. His views on foreign policy rested on a fundamental proposition: The United States of America could preserve its independence, security, and republican form of government only through a strong federal union, an effective national government, and constitutional restraints on the exercise of power.
The irony is extraordinary. On September 18, President Trump signed legislation intended to impose severe economic consequences on Russia for its unlawful aggression against Ukraine. Less than a month later, on October 16, he invoked the law’s waiver provisions to suspend most of its sanctions before they could become operative. Thus, legislation designed to punish Russian aggression has become an instrument of presidential discretion. Congress enacted the threat. The President signed it, but then decided not to carry it out.
This episode reveals far more than another disagreement over American foreign policy. It exposes the dangerous deterioration of the constitutional relationship between Congress and the presidency, while raising serious questions about the credibility of American diplomacy. The constitutional paradox is contained in Article I and Article II of the United States Constitution that vets legislative power in Congress, and entrusts executive authority to the President respectively. Neither article establishes an unlimited presidential prerogative to determine which laws deserve enforcement. Yet, the Graham Act contains a remarkable provision. Section 115 permits the President to waive sanctions, restrictions, and tariffs upon certifying Congress that such action serves the national interests of the United States of America by submitting an explanatory report. This is not a minor administrative exception. It is an exceptionally broad delegation of discretion concerning the central problem of the legislation.
The President has exploited that discretion. Legally, his decision appears to fall within the authority Congress granted him. Constitutionally, therefore, the immediate problem is not necessarily presidential lawlessness. It is congressional irresponsibility. Congress cannot credibly complain that the President has exercised powers that Congress itself deliberately conferred upon him. This is precisely where the constitutional problem becomes more serious than the conduct of any individual President. The separation of powers cannot function effectively when one branch voluntarily transfers essential policy decisions to another and subsequently expresses astonishment at the consequences.
The Graham Act was supposed to confront Russia with substantial economic penalties, including sanctions against financial institutions, energy-related activities, and entities facilitating sanctions evasion. It also contemplated punitive tariffs against major purchasers of Russian oil and natural gas. The underlying strategic purpose was straightforward: increase the economic cost of Russia’s continued aggression and strengthen the negotiating position of Ukraine, and its Western partners. Whether every contemplated sanction would have achieved its intended purpose is debatable, Broad secondary tariffs could also damage relations with partners and raise costs for American consumers. Nevertheless, Congress made a legislative decision that additional economic pressure was warranted.
The President now suspended much of that pressure. The timing is especially troubling. His decision follows his controversial arrangement involving Russian diesel, which has already raised objections among members of Congress concerned about providing additional revenue to the Kremlin. The combination of expanded Russian energy transactions and suspended sanctions creates an unmistakable contradiction between the declared objective of restraining Russian aggression, and the administration’s willingness to ease economic restrictions. Supporters of the administration may argue that diplomatic flexibility requires the ability to offer economic incentives. That argument deserves consideration. Yet, diplomacy becomes dangerous when concessions precede demonstrable changes in the adversary’s behavior. What, precisely, has Russia surrendered in exchange for this American flexibility? Has the Kremlin abandoned its territorial claims? Has it accepted Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity? Has it demonstrated a verifiable willingness to terminate the aggression? The waiver itself establishes none of these achievements.
When the White House threatens substantial penalties and then suspends them before implementation, the Kremlin may reasonably conclude that American economic pressure is negotiable even without meaningful Russian concessions. This is a strategic danger. A threat repeatedly announced, but inconsistently implemented, gradually loses credibility. Moreover, Ukraine’s survival depends not only on its armed forces, but also on the political determination of its partners. For Ukrainians, the suspension of new sanctions raises the obvious question: Can American commitments be relied upon when their implementation depends on rapidly changing presidential calculations? Europe faces a related dilemma. European governments have accepted substantial economic and strategic costs in confronting Russian aggression. Their policies are already complicated by disagreements over energy security, defense expenditures, and the future of European integration. An American policy that simultaneously announces punishment and provides exemptions makes coordinated Western action more difficult. It also risks encouraging European governments to hedge against future American unpredictability. The consequences extend beyond Ukraine. The People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other tyrannical governments carefully observe how the White House translates declarations into action. Inconsistency in one theatre can influence calculations in another. Otherwise, flexibility becomes indistinguishable from amateurish improvisation.
The responsibility for this geostrategic predicament cannot be assigned exclusively to President Trump. Congress must recover its constitutional responsibilities. If legislators believe that the President has undermined their objectives, they possess constitutional remedies. They can amend Section 115, establish strict time limits for waivers, require more demanding factual certifications, and mandate greater transparency concerning executive decisions. They also can conduct oversight hearings and insist that the administration explain how suspending sanctions advances American national security. Finally, they can legislate new restrictions, subject to the constitutional realities of presidential veto power. What Congress cannot reasonably do is surrender substantial authority and then pretend that its loss was entirely unexpected. The Founders did not establish Congress as an advisory council to the presidency. They created an independent legislative branch whose powers intended to restrain executive arbitrariness. A Congress unwilling to exercise its powers contributes to the very executive predominance it later condemns.
However, the larger failure of American statecraft of the Graham Act is the absence of a clearly demonstrated connection between the suspension of sanctions and concrete Russian concessions. A serious foreign policy requires consistency between objectives, instruments, and implementation. If America’s objective is to secure a durable peace that respects Ukrainian sovereignty – as it was accepted by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994 – , its economic policies must reinforce that objective. If America instead seeks a negotiated accommodation with Russia, it must explain its terms, limitations, and strategic benefits of that accommodation. Neither approach can succeed through contradictory signals.
A President has legitimate reasons to preserve diplomatic flexibility. Yet, flexibility without strategic discipline can become a source of weakness. Likewise, Congress has legitimate reasons to delegate certain implementation decisions. Yet, delegation without meaningful limitations can become an abdication of responsibilities. The result is a government capable of producing impressive legislation without ensuring that its provisions accomplish anything.
Clearly, the Graham Act controversy is ultimately about more than Russia, Ukraine, or Donald Trump. It concerns the character of the American constitutional government. A Republic cannot preserve the separation of powers merely by maintaining its institutional architecture. Its institutions must actually perform their assigned responsibilities. Congress must legislate with precision and defend its authority. The President must exercise delegated powers consistently with statutory requirements and explain decisions of profound national importance. Above all, American foreign policy must distinguish between genuine diplomacy and concessions unsupported by reciprocal obligations. The United States of America cannot credibly claim to impose consequences for aggression, while repeatedly making those consequences discretionary. The Graham Act was enacted to demonstrate American determination. Its immediate suspension instead demonstrates the dangers of granting sweeping presidential discretion without adequate congressional safeguards.
The ultimate constitutional as well as foreign policy tragedy is not that the President possesses too much authority. It is that Congress has become increasingly willing to surrender its own. Consequently, the ultimate geopolitical danger is that America’s adversaries may learn to take its threats less seriously than its concessions.