HOW A DEMOCRATIC IRAN COULD TRANSFORM THE MIDDLE EAST
Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran has aggressively attempted to export its Shi’a Twelver Islamic Revolution marked by the amalgamation of Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini’s intellectually extremely primitive Marxist worldview and egomaniacal Qur’an-centric beliefs. Therefore, a post-Khomenei free Iran should export nothing ideological. This deceptively simple proposition would transform the entire Middle East and beyond.
Since 1979, the Iranian Mullahcracy has frequently treated foreign policy not merely as a pursuit of Iranian national interests, but as an extension of its malevolently convoluted revolutionary ideology. This tyrannical Mullahcracy developed relationships with terroristic nonstate movements, made its absolute hostility toward the State of Israel central to its political identity, competed viciously with Arab governments for regional domination, confronted the United States of America militarily, and increasingly deepened strategic ties with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The result has been a remarkable historical distortion. The state of Iran – one of the world’s oldest civilizations – has increasingly been identified internationally not with Persian culture, but with modern revolutionary militancy.
The disappearance of the Mullahcracy would unambiguously create an opportunity considerably more impactful than regime change. It could allow Iran to become Iran again. And if a new democratic government – be it a Republic or a Constitutional Monarchy – understood the opportunity correctly, the geopolitical consequences would extend from Israel and Lebanon to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
A democratic Iran must begin with a foreign policy doctrine so elementary that its current Mullahcracy would regard it as heresy: Iran will neither export nor import any ideology. The Mullahs-free Iran’s foreign policy must serve identifiable Iranian interests. It must have good relations with the neighboring states. Secondly, it must end the artificial hostility with the State of Israel. Before 1979, Iran and Israel maintained extensive, if sometimes discreet relations. The Khomeini Revolution transformed the State of Israel into the “Little Satan” because the opposition to Zionism became a fundamental part of the Mullahcracy’s conception of itself. Thirdly, Iranian foreign policy must cease distinguishing between countries according to revolutionary theology. In this context, the first objective must be the termination of state-sponsored terrorism. No threats to eliminate the State of Israel. No financing of terrorist organizations for the purpose of attacking the West. No ideological warfare. Fourthly, Lebanon must belong to the Lebanese. A democratic Iran must distinguish between Lebanese Shiites – whose political and religious rights deserve exactly the same protection as those of every Lebanese community – and an armed organization operating as a state within a state. The principle must be straightforward: Iran will maintain relations with peoples and governments, not private terrorist organizations. Financial and military support for foreign terrorists must end. This principle must extend beyond Hezbollah to every Islamic and Non-Muslim terrorist organization whose military power depends substantially upon Iranian state sponsorship.
Nothing would determine international confidence more in a new Iranian government than nuclear policy. A democratic Iran would inherit whatever nuclear infrastructure, technical expertise and materials existed when the Islamic Republic ended. It would also inherit decades of international suspicion. The new government should recognize that transparency itself is a strategic asset. It must invite intensive cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, fully account for nuclear materials and seek a durable arrangement providing Iran access to peaceful nuclear technology under firm safeguards.
Relations with the United States of America would require similar maturity. A democratic Iran must not replace obsessive anti-Americanism with naive pro-Americanism. In other words, America should neither be the “Great Satan” nor the “Great Patron.” Concomitantly, the relationship with Russia must be rebalanced. The Mullahcracy’s increasingly close relationship with the Kremlin has rested substantially upon shared opposition to American influence and resistance to Western pressure. A democratic Iran would have no reason to continue this alignment automatically. Iran and Russia possess areas of cooperation. They also possess centuries of strategic rivalry. Iranian historical memory includes Russian imperial encroachment and territorial losses. Their interests diverge in the Caucasus, energy markets, Central Asia, and elsewhere. China presents a different problem. Beijing will remain important to Iran regardless of who is in charge in Tehran. The Mullahcracy’s isolation from Western markets increased its dependence upon a shrinking number of economic partners. A normalized Iran would possess many alternatives in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Gulf states. The Strait of Hormuz and the entire Persian Gulf must be a commercial artery and not a potential battlefield.
A democratic Iran must also alter the logic behind the Arab-Israeli normalization. The Abraham Accords have demonstrated that Arab governments and Israel could establish relations based upon national interests, despite the unresolved “Palestinian” conflict. As a consequence, Iran must compete inside a diplomatic order rather than through terrorist proxies outside of it. Finally, a democratic Iran must be able to transit conceptually from the “Axis of Resistance” to normal diplomatic relations. The former embodies the international pathology of the Mullahcracy. Resistance to what? For what permanent objective? Until when? Terrorist governments require permanent enemies because enemies justify permanent tyranny. Normal states require interests. A democratic Iran must replace the “Axis of Resistance” with something infinitely less dramatic and infinitely more productive, which is normal diplomatic relations.
Clearly, the Mullahcracy not merely must be defeated militarily, but also ideologically. The “Free Iran” doctrine must entail seven principles. First, Iranian national interest replaces the religion-based terrorist ideology. Second, Iran’s territorial integrity is absolute, but so is the equality of its citizens, including the 51% minorities majority human rights. Third, Iran must abandon for good the support of foreign terrorist organizations and militias who are seeking to substitute themselves for legitimate state authority. Fourth, Iran must respect every internationally recognized state’s right to exist, including the State of Israel. Fifth, Iran must seek nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under unlimited international safeguards. Sixth, Iran must maintain balanced relations with America, Europe, Russia, China, India, and its neighbors rather than becoming dependent on any block. Seventh, Iran must seek regional influence primarily through commerce, diplomacy, and civilization rather than revolutionary-terroristic aggression. In its globality, Iran must change from a revolutionary to a civilizational power. When these transformations happen, Iran would be a shining example of how a formerly great civilization could recover from a disgustingly failed fake religion-based so-called “Revolution.”