Dr. Mikos K. Radvanyi
Three months since the beginning of the war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, it appears that the Trump administration has fundamentally misread the real nature of the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist,” both domestically as well as internationally. By believing that coercive economic pressures could be an effective substitute for a successful Iran strategy, the White House inadvertently contributed to the transformation of the Islamic Republic from a broken clerical-tyrannical system into an even more centralized and militarized national-security state. The resulting political regime may prove to be more stable internally, but also more aggressive externally, and less susceptible to future diplomatic engagement than the hybrid theocratic system that preceded it.
The reform movements of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, although ultimately constrained by conservative institutions, had demonstrated the existence of significant social constituencies favoring political liberalization and international reintegration. The election of President Hassan Rouhani reflected this dynamic. In 2015, the JCPOA emerged from this context. This agreement itself was deeply imperfect. Critics correctly noted its sunset clauses, its limited scope regarding the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missile program, and its failure to address Tehran’s regional proxy networks. Nevertheless, the JCPOA functioned as a mechanism of political equilibrium within the Islamic Republic itself.
The Trump administration adopted the assumption that intensified economic pain would either compel Tehran to renegotiate the agreement under less favorable terms or destabilize the regime internally. This assumption reflected the thinking that equates economic coercion with political leverage. Yet, such reasoning often underestimates the adaptive capacities of tyrannical regimes operating under conditions of external threats. The Islamic Republic has responded to maximum pressure not through capitulation, but through securitization. As sanctions intensified, the Islamic Republic’s civilian economy deteriorated sharply. Inflation surged, foreign investments collapsed, and large segments of the middle class experienced severe economic decline. However, the weakening of civilian and private economic sectors simultaneously expanded the relative power of state-linked networks capable of operating under the sanctions. In effect, sanctions redistributed political power within the Islamic Republic.
One of the least appreciated consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA was the impact on Iran’s internal political legitimacy. The withdrawal severely weakened the credibility of the quasi-moderate factions. On the other hand, popular dissatisfaction did not translate into democratic transformation. Instead, the Mullahcracy has responded to the unrest through enhanced repression, surveillance, and coercive control. Thus, the long-term effect of the maximum pressure has been the failure to moderate Tehran’s behavior. Moreover, from a strategic perspective, the shortcomings of the maximum pressure has lacked a coherent theory of political change inside Iran. Therefore, policy objectives have fluctuated ambiguously between behavioral modifications, comprehensive renegotiation, deterrence, and implicit regime change. Such ambiguity has undermined continuity, credibility, and diplomacy.
The result was predictable: the Islamic Republic has become a hybrid political system, in which a relatively normal state and a revolutionary state have been operating simultaneously. This two-headed monster has expanded uranium enrichment activities, reduced cooperation with international monitoring mechanisms, and deepened strategic partnerships with non-Western powers, mainly with Moscow and Beijing. Thus, rather than isolating the Islamic Republic geopolitically, the maximum pressure contributed to the further fragmentation of the international order surrounding the Middle East.
The real accuracy of this statement is more than obvious in the present stalemate. One of the most important aspects about the U.S.-Iran-Israel confrontation is that it is often misunderstood as purely ideological or religious. Ideology matters, religious matters too, but the core engine is in reality strategic insecurity on all sides. The Islamic Republic fears encirclement, regime change, and strategic vulnerability. The U.S. and Israel fear nuclear breakout, regional coercion, and proxy warfare. Moreover, there is also a historical layer that shapes geopolitical thinking in Washington, D.C., Jerusalem, Tehran, and beyond. Finally, the Strait of Hormuz has also become a central problem.
In addition, there is Tehran’s propaganda about “Israel controls U.S. Iran policy.” In reality, Israel is an influential foreign-policy actor in Washington, D.C., but its influence operates through alignment with American strategic interests, domestic politics, intelligence cooperation, lobbying networks, military integration, and shared ideological narratives – not simple command-and-control mechanisms. In essence, Israel has made American policymakers aware of the fact that the Islamic Republic is not merely an Israeli problem, but the central threat to regional peace.
Yet, the U.S.-Iran-Israel triangle is geopolitically deeper because it combines nuclear strategy, regional rivalries, ideology, intelligence warfare, proxy conflicts, domestic political pressures, great-power competition, and all at once. The present political stalemate is the result of this complexity and the fact that neither side trusts the other to keep promises after domestic political change. The stalemate will persist because the “price of agreement” is politically dangerous for all three governments. Therefore, the most likely near-term outcome is limited de-escalation and not a grand bargain. Most probably, this will include partial sanction relief, controlled oil funds access, Hormuz guarantees, temporary enrichment caps, and renewed inspections.
However, the real solution, namely a full settlement, would require fundamental regime change and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Iran, represented by the Pahlavi dynasty. Partial normalization such as the Abraham Accords will not suffice to achieve a lasting regional peace in the Middle East. Contrary to all expectations, the Abraham Accords have not primarily been about lasting peace in the region. They have been about strategic realignment, technology, trade, intelligence exchange, missile defense, and anti-Iran coordination. Yet, such normalization has its limits. The GCC monarchies still fear regional war, domestic backlash, and being trapped in the U.S.-Iranian-Israeli escalation.
For all these reasons, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Iran would best contribute to political stability, economic modernization, and the elimination of religious as well as ideological terrorism by armed non-state organizations. Such a solution, albeit not perfect, would stabilize the region for a long time.