Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
Hungary’s over thousand years history is marked by a single tragicomical path: instead of progressing from the hopeless present to a better future, it has always descended unstoppably toward a markedly worse situation. In this eternally catastrophic conundrum, the political history of the 20th century became the most destructive for both the country at large and the individual in particular. Starting with World War I and continuing with World War II, Hungary went from being the governing member of an empire to losing two-thirds of its territory, and close to half of its indigenous population, while ending up after 1945 with the cannibalistic occupation of the tyrannical Soviet Union.
The post-Soviet thirty five years, have been wasted through the unseemliest wrangling for political power and gangster-like criminal enrichment activities by members of the former Communist elite and the newly emerging ruthlessly ambitious uncultured, inexperienced, and envious scoundrels who campaigned for votes under the guise of solipsistic patriotism and counterfeit democratic ideals. This self-defeating tyrannical mentality climaxed in the last sixteen years of Viktor Orban’s and his FIDESZ Party’s horrendous Gangsterocracy. During this period, the democracy ideal got stock in counting votes and claiming an absolute political entitlement for moral infallibility for those who used their absolute electoral majority as an unassailable justification for extreme oppression.
Peter Magyar and his newly formed TISZA Party came to office on May 9, 2026, after having won on April 12, 2026, a parliamentary supermajority. During the campaign, Peter Magyar promised to change the Viktor Orban Gangsterocracy, restore checks-and-balances on executive power, pursue corruption relentlessly, and repair Hungary’s relations with its European allies. Clearly, his government inherited extremely serious fiscal and institutional problems, so speed was understandable. Yet, speed also raised the stakes for sound policies. However, four episodes have exposed the panicky precipitous actions of political weaknesses of the Peter Magyar government. First, the removal of the former President Tamas Sulyok through a constitutional amendment, while launching a wider constitutional overhaul and anti-corruption drive. Clearly, Tamas Sulyok was Viktor Orban’s puppet. However, even when a governing supermajority has the votes, changing constitutional rules to dislodge a current officeholder invites the charge that constitutional design is serving an immediate political purpose. Second, the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (Hungarian acronyms: HVVH). Its leadership selection produced a withdrawn candidacy, shifting accounts of whom Peter Magyar backed, disagreement within the TISZA Party, and public criticism that Peter Magyar answered defensively. The Office may do essential work; its credibility depends on visible independence and exceptionally careful appointments. In this respect, the question emerges whether there was a need for this office. Moreover, whether the selection of Anna Unger, who does not have legal qualifications and, therefore, never worked as a lawyer in any capacity is heading a brand new organization mostly duplicates the functions of the already existing judicial institutions. Third, Ukraine and Hungary’s regional diplomacy. After Peter Magyar presented a minority-rights agreement with Ukraine as a breakthrough, Hungary continued to block the opening of several EU accession negotiating clusters, citing concerns about implementation. That concern may be legitimate, but the difference between a celebrated agreement and continued blockage required a clearer public explanation. In September, Peter Magyar also said that Hungary was not joining the proposed Carpathian Eight, despite a Hungarian Embassy representative attending its first meeting; he claimed that he had not known of participation at the prime-ministerial level. Finally, the General Prosecutor’s Office. The TISZA Party supermajority declined to support the new president’s nominee for Prosecutor General amid reported concerns about his family connection to the Ukrainian money transportation case. Days later, Peter Magyar publicly sparred with the existing prosecutor’s office over requests to lift parliamentary immunity, using accusatory language. A prime minister can criticize prosecutorial conduct. He should be especially disciplined when his government’s central promise is an independent judiciary.
The lesson is that Hungary cannot be rebuilt by chaotic improvisation. Personally, Peter Magyar risks weakening his huge mandate every time he treats an announcement as a substitute for a settled policy, a parliamentary supermajority as a substitute for institutional restraints, or an angry reply as a substitute for prime-ministerial judgment. Hungary’s problems cannot be solved at the pace of a campaign rally. Constitutional reform, criminal accountability, fiscal recovery, and diplomacy each require different methods. They must also fit together. In its first five months, the Peter Magyar government has too often given the impression of moving on all fronts without explaining which decisions are final, which are conditional, and what safeguards will govern them. The constitution is not merely a tool for removing today’s officeholders. The National Asset Recovery Office presents a different problem. The question now is whether its procedures and results will persuade citizens beyond the governing party’s supporters. Peter Magyar’s impatient response to criticism did nothing to help that cause. Foreign policy is in chaos. Allies and voters alike need to know the principles that would govern Hungary’s positions. The confusions over Ukraine’s EU membership and the fledgling Carpathian Eight are revealing. Yet, most troubling is the tone surrounding the General Prosecutor’s Office. Peter Magyar must not make every prosecutorial dispute look like a contest of political wills.
None of this makes the difficulties Peter Magyar and his party inherited disappear. Viktor Orban’s institutional legacy, the pressure on public finances, and the demand for accountability are real. Nor does every disputed appointment prove bad faith, or every diplomatic disagreement proves incompetence. The criticism is more serious than either accusation: a government elected to replace personalized tyranny must show that its decisions emerge from dependable institutions, clear priorities, and rules it would accept in opposition too. Peter Magyar still has time to establish that standard. Hungarians voted for “regime change” and a reconstruction of the republic. They are entitled to more than the energy of the man who won the election. They are entitled to the patience, coordination, and self-restraint of a government capable of governing it.