Dr. Miklos K. Radvanyi
The crooked immorality of contemporary political correctness has been in full display since the Democrats have discovered another remarkable innovation in the increasingly crowded marketplace of idiotic political absurdities. In the state of New Jersey, legislators have proposed defining Islamophobia as a form of racism. Evidently, the guardians of contemporary morality have concluded that criticism of a religion may, under certain circumstances, constitute racial prejudice. An extraordinary intellectual achievement, considering that Islam is not a race. Yet, never mind such inconvenient distinctions. In the fashionable universe of ideological righteousness, definitions are apparently no longer expected to describe reality. Their principal purpose is to identify approved victims, disapproved critics, and the permissible boundaries of public debate.
This brings us to a question that the authors of New Jersey Assembly Bill A1146 ought to confront: Is hostility toward Islam or Muslims constitute racism, what should we call the ruthless anti-Jewish hatred found in almost every Islamic religious texts, historical traditions, and contemporary Islamist ideologies? An unfortunate theological misunderstanding? Or perhaps an ancient expression of diversity that must be respectfully accommodated? These questions are not rhetorical merely for amusement. It exposes a serious inconsistency in the intellectual foundations of contemporary discussions about religious prejudice.
The historical relationship between Judaism and Islam is considerably more complicated than either romantic defenders or indiscriminate critics of Islam generally acknowledge. The Qur’an recognizes Jews and Christians as People of the Book. It also contains passages critical of particular Jewish communities, their alleged conduct, and their relationship with divine revelation. Some passages are especially evil. Qur’an 5:60 refers to divine punishment involving transformation into apes and swines. Qur’an 2:65 addresses Sabbath violators who were transformed into apes. Qur’an 5:82 describes Jews and polytheists as among the strongest in hatred toward believers. These passages have different historical contexts and competing interpretations. They cannot responsibly be treated as a universal description of what every Muslim believes about Jews. Nevertheless, they exist. They have influenced religious polemics, and some have been appropriated by modern antisemites. Most disturbing is a Hadith recorded in Sahih Muslim, Book 54, Hadith 103, in which an apocalyptic confrontation is described involving Muslims fighting Jews, with stones and trees revealing where Jews are hiding. This tradition has been fully exploited by Muslim extremists as well as terrorist organizations to legitimize hatred toward Jews. Consider the original 1988 Covenant of Hamas. Its Article 7 invokes the aforementioned Hadith concerning the murdering of Jews. Article 22 advances conspiracy theories about Jewish influence over international institutions, finance, and historical events. These are no harmless expressions of theological disagreements. They are manifestations of evil antisemitic ideology. Likewise, Hamas’s 2017 political document attempted to distinguish Jews as a religious community from Zionists as political adversaries. Yet, that subsequent distinction does not erase the antisemitic content of the original covenant or the organization’s history.
The distinction between opposition to Israeli government policies and hatred toward Jews is essential. Criticism of Israel is not automatically antisemitic. Yet, neither does the vocabulary of anti-Zionism automatically absolve rhetoric that demonizes Jews collectively. Here, contemporary political discourse frequently performs a remarkable feat of intellectual gymnastics. A sweeping generalization about Muslims may properly be condemned as prejudice. A sweeping generalization of Jews, however, can sometimes be excused as political resistance, anti-colonialism, or a reaction to events in the Middle East. How convenient. Apparently, collective hatred becomes morally objectionable only after appropriate ideological classification has been completed.
Let us consider the logic. If a Christian condemns Islamic religious doctrines, does that constitute Islamophobia? Not necessarily, although careless applications of expansive definitions could blur the distinction. If a Muslim preacher describes Jews collectively as treacherous, evil, or deserving divine punishment, is that antisemitism? Certainly, when a language attributes hateful characteristics to Jews as a people. If a political organization invokes religious authority to justify violence against Jews, should that be condemned? Without hesitation. The moral standard should be identical. Yet, much contemporary discourse appears uncomfortable with precisely this symmetry. We are repeatedly instructed to distinguish Islamic extremism from Islam as a whole. Correctly so. Yet, why should we not also distinguish legitimate criticism of Israel from antisemitism, and legitimate Islamic theology from interpretations that promote anti-Jewish hatred? The answer should be obvious. Unfortunately, obvious answers have become an endangered species in ideological politics.
No religious civilization deserves exemption from historical scrutiny. Indeed, genuine respect for religious freedom requires precisely the opposite: the willingness to examine every religious tradition critically. The American Constitution does not exist to protect theological doctrines from embarrassment. Its First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion and the freedom to criticise religion. Muslims have the constitutional right to practice Islam. Jews have the constitutional right to practice Judaism. Christians, Hindus, atheists, and others enjoy equivalent protections. And every American possesses the right to reject, criticize, or ridicule the religious claims of others, subject to generally applicable laws governing threats, harassment, discrimination, and other unlawful conduct. New Jersey’s A1146 does not itself establish a new crime criticizing Islam. It proposes a definition for consideration in applying existing civil and criminal law and contains a provision preserving constitutional rights. Nevertheless, its broad language raises legitimate concerns about how government officials might distinguish prejudice against Muslims from criticism of Islamic beliefs. This is where legislators should demonstrate consistency. If government officials are instructed to identify anti-Muslim prejudice, they must also recognize antisemitism, including when it is expressed through Islamic religious or politcal rhetoric. They must not assume that religiously motivated hatred becomes immune from examination because its proponents belong to another religious community. Religious liberty is not a license to discriminate, intimidate, or threaten. Nor is the protection of religious liberty a mandate to suppress criticism of religion.
More significantly, there is profoundly disturbing news about a political culture that increasingly evaluates statements according to the identity of the speaker rather than the content of the statement. Prejudice does not become virtuous when expressed by someone regarded as historically disadvantaged. Hatred does not become justice when dressed in the vocabulary of liberation. And antisemitism does not cease to be antisemitism merely because its advocates invoke religious scripture or opposition to Zionism. The same principle applies in reverse: anti-Muslim hatred cannot be justified by pointing to antisemitic statements made by particular Muslim preachers or organizations. Collective guilt is morally indefensible in either direction.
The greatest irony is that advocates of broad definitions of Islamophobia may unintentionally undermine the very principles of religious equality they claim to defend. A society genuinely committed to equality cannot establish a privileged category of religious beliefs whose criticism becomes presumptively suspect. Nor can it tolerate anti-Jewish hatred simply because acknowledging its religious sources might produce political discomfort. There is no constitutional hierarchy of religious sensitivities. The United States of America is not governed by the Qur’an, Torah, the New Testament, or the pronouncements of fashionable ideological movements. It is governed by a Constitution that protects the individual against governmental coercion. This constitutional arrangement remains one of the greatest achievements of American civilization. Its preservation requires the courage to criticize religious intolerance wherever it appears, including within Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or any other tradition.
In closing, equal justice under law means equal standards of moral judgement without religious exceptions, ideological exemptions, or politically convenient double standards.